Interlinking of rivers — II

By A. Vaidyanathan

It is difficult to believe that the interlinking programme has been worked out in sufficient detail to qualify for serious examination, leave alone immediate implementation.

ENTHUSIASTS OF interlinking of rivers tend to be dismissive of the concerns over the environmental and human consequences of the project. They claim that these fears are vastly exaggerated or argue that they are unavoidable costs of "development" and that they should not be allowed to hold back the project. One has to be extraordinarily insensitive not to recognise the consequences of ignoring these aspects in our water resource planning in the past. They are reflected in the callous manner in which displaced persons have been treated, land degradation due to misuse of water, depletion of groundwater and the growing pollution of water sources. The experience of the Indira Gandhi Canal is a stark example of the problems arising in the wake of bringing in vast amounts of water without adequate understanding of and concern for its impact on the fragile desert ecology.

There are also good reasons to be sceptical about the state of preparation for the interlinking projects. Anyone familiar with the planning of projects such as Bhakra Nangal and Sardar Sarovar knows that the detailed investigations and site surveys preparatory to the design and the analyses and studies needed for the actual design take many years of intensive effort and expense by a large body of experts in diverse fields. A mega project of such complexity as interlinking of rivers calls for preparatory work of far, far greater dimensions. Moreover, the quality of preparatory investigations and surveys for many, if not most, of the irrigation and water resource projects leave much to be desired. Inadequate investigations, changes in scope and design, huge cost escalations and inordinate delays in completing projects are all-too-familiar features of irrigation planning in the recent decades.

Under these circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the interlinking programme has been worked out in sufficient detail to qualify for serious examination, leave alone immediate implementation. The best way to counter this scepticism is to make all the studies, analyses and reports available for public scrutiny.

There is little authenticated information on the likely cost of the programme and its various component projects. Figures as high as Rs. 5,600 billion are mentioned but no details are available. This is about 50 times the total allocation for the ongoing water resource development projects in the Tenth Plan.

In a situation of severe resource scarcity, the question of the relative priorities to be accorded to the improvement of existing facilities and the expeditious completion of viable projects on hand as against mega projects based on questionable premises is particularly relevant. This issue ought to be debated seriously. Questions about the sources of funds for interlinking tend to be dismissed cavalierly. The notion that private sources can be attracted is the height of naivete and wishful thinking. A Government already saddled with huge public debt, and whose precarious fiscal situation continues to deteriorate rapidly, can hardly expect the financial institutions to fork out such large sums for a programme, the content and economic viability of which have not been assessed.

There are also important institutional and legal issues to be sorted out. There is no provision for any mechanism to deal with matters concerning inter-basin transfers. The Centre has no legal authority to decide on this and no State will agree to vest the authority with the Centre. There is talk of deciding these matters through consultation and consensus among the States. One can hardly take this seriously, given our experience with the working of existing laws and procedures for dealing with water allocation between the States within the same basin. The allocation of water among riparian States even within a single river basin has so far been determined by law through negotiated legal agreements and treaties, and by judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms such as tribunals. We know from experience how contentious, prolonged and difficult this process is. The awards themselves have so far been accepted as binding on all the States concerned and the Centre. But the implementation of these awards has given rise to innumerable inter-State conflicts, which the Centre, despite the powers given to it under the law and its financial clout, has been unable to prevent or settle. These disputes and conflicts are the subject of numerous litigations. The courts have been cautious in dealing with these cases and have instead suggested that they be settled through mutual discussion, arbitration, Central mediation and other extra-judicial mechanisms.

This caution is both wise and understandable, given the complexity of the issues involved and the fact that courts have no means to enforce the judgments and the record of compliance by Governments is at best mixed. No judgment or award can satisfy all the interested parties. Indeed, of late, the States are pleading their inability to enforce court judgments on grounds that they are unfair and likely to cause unmanageable law and order problems. Instances of Governments condoning blatant violations of their own rules regarding allocation of uses of water and acquiescing or even permitting the violation of established rules regarding the rights of access and use are distressingly widespread.

These questions are pertinent and basic to a considered assessment of the river-linking programme. In the absence of satisfactory answers, criticisms of the decision to go ahead with the implementation of the project are reasonable and legitimate. The current discussions in the media and on public forums hardly focus on these issues, much less help allay the apprehensions. That would call for a serious, open and informed debate based on facts and analyses. Regrettably, apart from a few sketch maps purported to be taken from the Hashim Commission report, very little information on the specific schemes envisaged, details of their design, environmental impact, displacement, and likely costs and benefits is available in the public domain.

Even the main report of the Commission, though claimed to be a priced publication, cannot be obtained from either the Ministry or the Publications Division. The annexure to the report, in which the details have reportedly been discussed, are considered secret.

Time was when the opinions of the Government's irrigation establishment were accepted without much question. Times have changed. There is much greater awareness now that there is more, much more to water resource development than constructing dams and canals, that the process of scrutiny and appraisal is at once too narrow, too lax and too secretive, and that there is now a sizeable body of knowledge and expertise on water resource management outside the Government. The assessments of the engineering establishments are no longer taken as beyond challenge. Hardly anyone takes seriously, much less accepts, the claim that "the National Perspective Plan (linking rivers) has been drawn up by a scientific and professional organisation, conceptually and technically upheld by the Technical Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Water Resources, the Central Water Commission and the National Commission on Integrated Water Resources Development Plan... " and that "... the studies have been ratified by engineers, sociologists and economists". If this is so, why should the details of these studies and appraisals be a closely-held secret, instead of being made public to facilitate informed discussion?

The least that Suresh Prabhu, head of the task force on interlinking rivers, can do is to make all the relevant reports and documents available to the public and provide an opportunity for various interested "stake holders" to voice their concerns.